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Abstract—While several BDI logics have been proposed in the
area of Agent Programming, it is not clear how these logics
are connected to the agent programs they are supposed to
specify. More yet, the reasoning problems in these logics, being
based on modal logic, are not tractable in general, limiting their
usage to tackle real-world problems. In this work, we use of
Dynamic Preference Logic to provide a semantic foundation
to BDI agent programming languages and investigate tractable
expressive fragments of this logic to reason about agent programs.
With that, we aim to provide a way of implementing semantically
grounded agent programming languages with tractable reasoning
cycles.
Index Terms—Dynamic Epistemic Logic; Agent Programming;
Formal Semantics; BDI Logics;
I. INTRODUCTION
In the study of rational action and agency, several different
logics and formal theories for practical reasoning have been
proposed. Particularly, the Belief, Desire Intention framework
[1] has become a popular approach to practical reasoning in the
areas of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Agents, giving
rise to the construction of several programming languages and
computer systems.
Having a formal definition of its semantics is essential for
proving properties about a programming language and also
for providing a formal framework to specify and to verify
properties about a system’s behaviour. For agent programming
languages, a formal semantics also clarifies the notion of
agency it carries.
Recently, it has been proposed that Dynamic Preference
Logic (DPL) can be used to reason about BDI Agent Pro-
gramming with declarative mental attitudes [2], providing a.
a computable two-way translation between specifications in
the logic and agent programs. Reasoning in DPL is, however,
not tractable in general. As such, the use of DPL for reasoning
about agent programming - while theoretically relevant for the
analysis of a programming language semantics - is of very
limited practical use.
In this work, we investigate expressive fragments of the
language of DPL that yield tractable reasoning problems. The
reasoning problems discussed in this paper are concerned
with knowing whether an agent knows (believes, desires or
intends) a certain propositional property ϕ and how to compute
the resulting mental state of an agent after performing a
belief/desire revision or contraction. With this, we aim to
provide a tractable fragment that may be used to implement
an actual agent programming language with declarative mental
attitudes having a well-defined logical semantics based on
Kripke frames.
This work is structured as follows: in Section II we present
the logic of agency proposed here, based on Dynamic Prefer-
ence Logic; in Section III we discuss the connection between
the logic proposed and Agent Programming. In Section IV,
we discuss a tractable expressive subset of the language which
can be used to implement agent programming languages. In
section V, we present the related work and compare their
contributions to ours. Finally, in Section VI, we present our
final considerations.
II. A DYNAMIC LOGIC FOR BDI PROGRAMMING
In this section, we present a dynamic propositional modal
logic of agency which will be used to specify an agent’s mental
state. Throughout this work, we will assume the existence of a
set P of propositional symbols and we will denote by L0 the
language of propositional logic constructed over the symbols
in P .
We assume a BDI agent has a library of plans describing
which actions she can perform on the environment. For the
sake of simplicity, we will assume that the plans are determin-
istic, completely specified and STRIPS-like. Aware of these
restrictions, we introduce the notion of plan library.
Definition 1. We call A = 〈Π, pre, pos〉 a plan library, iff Π is
a finite set of plans symbols, pre, pos : Π→ L0 are functions
that map each plan to its preconditions and post-conditions,
respectively. We further require that the post-conditions of any
plan is a consistent conjunction of propositional literals. We
say α ∈ A for any plan symbol α ∈ Π.
With this definition in mind, we can establish the language
we will use as a base for our constructions.
Definition 2. Let A = 〈Π, pre, pos〉 be a plan library. We
define the language L≤P ,≤D(A) by the following grammar
(where p ∈ P and α ∈ A):
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Aϕ | [≤P ]ϕ | [<P ]ϕ
| [≤D]ϕ | [<D]ϕ | [α]ϕ | Iα
The formula Aϕ means that it is universally true that ϕ
holds, while the formula [≤D]ϕ ([≤P ]ϕ) means that in all
worlds equally or more desirable (plausible) than the current
one, ϕ holds and [<D]ϕ ([<P ]ϕ) meaning that in all worlds
strictly more desirable (plausible) than the current one, ϕ
holds. Finally, the formulas [α]ϕ and Iα mean that after
carrying out the plan α, the property ϕ holds, and that the
agent intends to execute a plan α, respectively. As usual,
we will define Eϕ ≡ ¬A¬ϕ and 〈≤〉ϕ ≡ ¬[≤]¬ϕ with
 ∈ {P,D}.
To interpret these formulas, we introduce the notion of agent
model - which will be used to represent an agent’s mental state.
Definition 3. Let A = 〈Π, pre, pos〉 be a plan library. An
agent model is a tuple M = 〈W,≤P ,≤D, I, v〉 where W is a
set of possible worlds, and both ≤P and ≤D are pre-orders
over W with well-founded strict parts <P and <D, I ⊆ Π
is a set of adopted plans (or intentions), and v is a valuation
function.
To model the effect of executing a plan α ∈ A given an
agent model M , we will define the notion of model update,
as commonly used in the area of Dynamic Epistemic Logic.
Definition 4. Let A = 〈Π, pre, pos〉 be a plan library, α ∈ A
a plan, and M = 〈W,≤P ,≤D, I, v〉 an agent model. The
update of model M by execution of plan α is defined as the
model M ⊗ [A, α] = 〈W ′,≤′P ,≤
′
D, I
′, v′〉 where
W ′ = {w ∈W | M,w  pre(α)}
≤′

= ≤ ∩ W
′ ×W ′
I ′ = I
v′(p) =


W ′ if pos(α)  p
∅ if pos(α)  ¬p
v(p) ∩ W ′ otherwise
The interpretation of the formulas is defined as usual, with
each modality corresponding to an accessibility relation.
M,w  [≤P ]ϕ iff ∀w′ ∈W : w′ ≤P w ⇒M,w′  ϕ
M,w  [<P ]ϕ iff ∀w′ ∈W : w′ <P w ⇒M,w′  ϕ
M,w  [≤D]ϕ iff ∀w′ ∈W : w′ ≤D w ⇒M,w′  ϕ
M,w  [<D]ϕ iff ∀w′ ∈W : w′ <D w ⇒M,w′  ϕ
M,w  [α]ϕ if M,w  pre(α) then M ⊗ [A, α], w  ϕ
M,w  Iα iff α ∈ I
In this work, we denote the most plausible (similarly,
desirable) worlds in the set S by Min≤PS. In other words,
Min≤PS = {w ∈ S | ∀w
′ ∈ S : w′ ≤P w⇒ w ≤P w
′}
Let ϕ ∈ L≤P ,≤D(A), we also define the formula
µPϕ ≡ (ϕ ∧ ¬〈<P 〉ϕ) (similarly, µDϕ), which is satisfied
exactly by the minimal worlds according to the order ≤P
(similarly for ≤D) which satisfy the formula ϕ, i,e, JµPϕK =
Min≤JϕK. These formulas will be useful to encode mental
attitudes in this logic.
A. Enconding mental attitudes
Following Souza et al [3] [2], we introduce a codification
of mental attitudes in the language L≤P ,≤D (A). In this work,
we interpret the notion of ‘possible world’ as epistemically
possible, not metaphysically possible. As such, the universal
modality can be used to encode the knowledge held by an
agent.
Kϕ ≡ Aϕ
We encode the (KD45) notion of belief as what is true in
the worlds that the agent believes to be the most plausible
ones. As such, our notion Bϕ means that ‘it is most plausible
that ϕ.’
Bϕ ≡ A(µP⊤ → ϕ)
Similar to belief, we propose a codification of (consistent)
desires as everything that is satisfied in all most desirable
worlds.
G(ϕ) ≡ A(µD⊤ → ϕ)
Our language possesses the notion of procedural intentions
by the formula Iα. To encode Bratman’s [1] notion of prospec-
tive intention, we will define a formula Intϕ. First, however,
we must encode the restrictions imposed by Bratman for
consistency of an intention by means of a formulaAdmInt(ϕ)
meaning that ‘it is admissible for the agent to intend that ϕ’.
AdmInt(ϕ) ≡ G(ϕ) ∧ E(ϕ) ∧ ¬B(ϕ)
With this notion, we can define the notion of having an
‘intention that ϕ.’
Int(ϕ) ≡ AdmInt(ϕ) ∧
∨
α∈A
(Iα ∧B (pre(α) ∧ [α]ϕ))
Notice that, while we imposed several restrictions in our
codification for an agent to rationally hold some prospective
intention, none of these restrictions have been required for an
agent to hold a procedural intention, i.e. an intention to do -
here represented by the set of adopted plans I in the model. To
model the kind of agent that satisfies Bratman’s restrictions,
we define the notion of a coherent agent model, i.e. an agent
having a coherent mental state.
Definition 5. Let A be a plan library and M =
〈W,≤P ,≤D, I, v〉 be an agent model. We say a set I ⊂ Π
of plans is A-coherent in M if for all α ∈ I , M  B(pre(α))
and M  AdmInt(pos(α)). If I is A-coherent in M , we say
M is a coherent agent model.
B. Dynamic operations on agent’s mental states
Once established the basic language and the encodings
of mental attitudes, we define some well-behaved mental
operations, which will be used to implement agents’ practical
reasoning. Here we explore three dynamic operations on agent
models, each a representative of the three basic mental opera-
tions as studied by the Belief Revision Theory [4]: expansion,
revision and contraction.
The first operation we introduce is that of public an-
nouncement. This operation corresponds, in a sense, to the
operation of expansion from Belief Revision Theory. Based
on the codifications we provided in the previous section,
this operation can be interpreted as the mental operation of
knowledge acquisition.
Definition 6. Let M = 〈W,≤P ,≤D, I, v〉 be a coherent
agent model and ϕ a formula of L0. We say the model
M!ϕ = 〈W!ϕ,≤P !ϕ,≤D!ϕ, I!ϕ, v!ϕ〉 is the result of public
announcement of ϕ in M , where:
W!ϕ = {w ∈W | M,w  ϕ}
≤!ϕ = ≤ ∩ (W!ϕ ×W!ϕ)
I!ϕ is the maximal subset of I that is A− coherent
v!ϕ(p) = v(p) ∩ W!ϕ
The radical upgrade of an agents beliefs by an information
ϕ results in a model such that all worlds satisfying ϕ are
deemed more plausible than those not satisfying it. This
operation corresponds to a operation of belief revision from
belief Revision Theory.
Definition 7. LetM = 〈W,≤P ,≤D, I, v〉 be a coherent agent
model and ϕ a formula of L0. We say the model M⇑ϕ =
〈W,≤P⇑ϕ,≤D, I⇑Pϕ, v〉 is the result of the radical upgrade
on the plausibility of M by ϕ, where
≤P⇑ϕ= (≤P \{〈w,w′〉 | M,w 6 ϕ and M,w′  ϕ})∪
{〈w,w′〉 | M,w  ϕ and M,w′ 6 ϕ}
I⇑Pϕ is the maximal subset of I that is A− coherent
We can similarly define the radical upgrade of the agents
desires by the operation ⇑D ϕ, which updates the desirability
relation, instead of the plausibility relation.
Lastly, we introduce the operation of lexicographic con-
traction [5]. This operation corresponds to performing a re-
ordering of the worlds in a way that both ϕ and ¬ϕ are
considered equally plausible (or equally desirable) to the agent.
To define this operation in a more elegant way, we will define
the notion of the plausibility degree of a world.
Definition 8. LetM = 〈W,≤P ,≤D, I, v〉 be a coherent agent
model, w ∈ W a possible world and ϕ ∈ L≤P ,≤D(A) a
formula. We say that w has plausibility degree n ∈ N for φ,
denoted n = dP ϕ(w), if M,w  ϕ and there is a maximal
chain w0 <P w1 <P w2 <P . . . <P wn s.t. ∀i : wi ∈ JϕK,
w0 ∈Min≤P JϕK and wn = w.
We can define the desirability degree of a world w for ϕ,
denoted by dDϕ(w), the same way. With that notion, we define
the lexicographic contraction as below.
Definition 9. LetM = 〈W,≤P ,≤D, I, v〉 be a coherent agent
model and ϕ a formula of L0. We say the model M⇓Pϕ =
〈W,≤P⇓ϕ,≤D, I⇓Pϕ, v〉 is the lexicographic contraction of
the plausibility of M by ϕ, where:
w ≤P⇓ϕ w
′ iff


w ≤P w
′ if w,w′ ∈ JϕK
w ≤P w
′ if w,w′ 6∈ JϕK
dP ϕ(w) < dP¬ϕ(w
′) if w ∈ JϕK and
w′ 6∈ JϕK
dP¬ϕ(w) < dP ϕ(w
′) if w 6∈ JϕK and
w′ ∈ JϕK
I⇓P ϕis the maximal subset of I that is A− coherent
As before, we can similarly define the lexicographic con-
traction on the desirability of M by ϕ (denoted by M⇓Dϕ).
These operations correspond to the contraction (or abandon-
ment) of a belief/desire by the agent.
For each operation ⋆ defined before, we introduce a new
modality [⋆ϕ]ψ in our language, meaning “after the operation
of ⋆ by ϕ, ψ holds”. which can be interpreted as
M,w  [⋆ϕ]ψ iff M⋆ϕ, w  ψ
An important result about the dynamified logic is that, if
we consider some special kind of model, which includes the
models we will use in Section III to reason about Agent
Programming, it has the same expressibility as the static logic
presented before [2]. In fact, the formulas [!ϕ]ψ, [⇑ ϕ]ψ and
[⇓ ϕ]ψ, with  ∈ {P,D}, are definable in the language
L≤P ,≤D(A) by a set of reduction axioms.
III. REASONING ABOUT BDI AGENTS USING DPL
An interesting property of Preference Logic - the logic used
as a foundation to construct L≤P ,≤D (A) - is that preference
models can be encoded by means of some structures known
as priority graphs [6]. Exploring this connection, we will
show how we can use agent programs with stratified mental
attitudes, e.g. beliefs annotated with their credence/plausibility
level, to obtain a model for the agent’s mental state.
In most BDI agent programming languages, an agent pro-
gram is defined by means of a tuple ag = 〈K,B,D, I〉,
where K , B and D are sets of (ranked) propositional for-
mulas representing the agent’s knowledge, beliefs and desires,
respectively, and I is a set of plans adopted by the agent.
A ranked formula 〈ϕ, n〉 expresses that the agent has a
certain degree of uncertainty in the information ϕ. As such, if
the agent has 〈ϕ, n〉 in her belief base, it means that the agent
believes that ϕ is true with an uncertainty degree of n.
Definition 10. Let P be a set of propositional variables and
A a plan library. We call an agent program over A, a tuple
of finite sets ag = 〈K,B,D, I〉 where:
• K ⊂ L0 is the knowledge base;
• B ⊂ L0 × N is called the stratified belief base.
• D ⊂ L0 × N is called a stratified goal base.
• I ⊂ A is the (procedural) intention base.
When the plan library A is clear, we will often call the tuple
ag = 〈K,B,D, I〉 an agent program.
Given the definition above, we define the mental attitudes
of an agent, i.e. what she knows, believes, etc. by means of
the components of an agent program. Notice that our belief
and desire bases are stratified, in the sense that the beliefs
(similarly desires) of an agent are ranked according to their
plausibility. Since some of these beliefs may be contradictory
with each other, we must compute the maximal set of beliefs
(desires) that is consistent - respecting the stratification of the
base.
Definition 11. Let Γ ⊂ L0×N be a finite set of pairs 〈ϕ, i〉 and
let Γi = {ϕ | 〈ϕ, i〉 ∈ Γ}. We define the maximal consistent
subset of Γ, the set ΓMax ⊂ L0, s.t.
• ΓMax ⊆
⋃
Γi and if 〈ϕ, i〉 ∈ Γ and ϕ ∈ ΓMax then
Γi ⊆ ΓMax;
• ∀Γ′ ⊆
⋃∞
i=1 Γ : (∃Γi ⊆ Γ
′ ∧ Γi 6⊆ ΓMax ⇒ Γ′ 
⊥ or ∃Γj ⊆ ΓMax ∧ Γj 6⊆ Γ′ and j < i)
With this in mind, we can provide interpretations of the
notions of belief and desire by means of such bases.
Definition 12. Let ag = 〈K,B,D, I〉 be an agent program
and ϕ ∈ L0. We define what an agent believes, desires and
intends as:
• ag  Kϕ, iff K  ϕ
• ag  Bϕ, iff BMax  ϕ
• ag  Gϕ, iff DMax  ϕ
• ag  Iϕ, iff ag  Gϕ and ∃α ∈ I , s.t. pos(α)  ϕ
While we placed no condition on agent programs, since in
this work we adhere to Bratman’s [1] notion of intention, our
declarative mental attitudes must satisfy some constraints in
order for the agent to be considered rational.
Definition 13. Let ag = 〈K,B,D, I〉 be an agent program.
We say ag is coherent iff all of the conditions below hold.
1) Knowledge consistency: K 6 ⊥
2) Belief-Knowledge consistency: ϕ ∈ K iff 〈ϕ, 0〉 ∈ B
3) Desire-Knowledge consistency: ϕ ∈ K iff 〈ϕ, 0〉 ∈ D
4) Intention-Desire consistency: for all α ∈ I there is a ϕ
in DMax s.t. pos(α) L0 ϕ;
5) Pursuable plan: ∀α ∈ I : ag  B(pre(α));
6) Intention consistency: {pos(α) | α ∈ I} 6 ⊥;
7) Plans are relevant: ∀α ∈ I : ag 6 B(pos(α)).
Liu [6] shows that preference relations can be equivalently
represented by means of syntactical constructs, known as
priority graphs. A priority graph, however, is nothing more
than a partial order over propositional formulas, much similar
to the stratified bases we introduced here. As such, we can use
the same reasoning to compute the plausibility and desirability
orders of an agent model by means of belief and desire bases.
Definition 14. Let Γ ⊂ L0 × N be a stratified base, W a
set of possible worlds and v : L0 → W a valuation function.
Considering Γi = {ϕ | 〈ϕ, i〉 ∈ Γ} and w  X to stand
for ∀ϕ ∈ X : (w ∈ v(ϕ)), then we define the pre-order
≤Γ ⊆ W ×W s.t.
w ≤Γ w′iff ∀i ∈ N : (w′  Γi ⇒ w  Γi)∨
(∃j < i s.t. (w  Γj and w
′ 6 Γj))
Using this construction, we are able to construct an agent
model from an agent program.
Definition 15. Let ag = 〈K,B,D, I〉 be an agent pro-
gram, we define the model induced by ag as Mag =
〈JKK,≤B,≤D, I, v〉 where JKK ⊂ 2P are all the proposi-
tional valuations that satisfy the set K , ≤B⊂ JKK× JKK and
≤D⊆ JKK× JKK are the preference relations induced by the
bases B and D, as described in Definition 14, and w ∈ v(p)
iff p ∈ w.
Finally, since preference relations can always be encoded
as priority graphs [6], we can always compute agent programs
describing mental models.
Proposition 16. Let M = 〈W,≤P≤D, I, v〉 be an agent
model, with W ⊆ 2P , then there is an agent program
ag = 〈K,B,D, I〉 s.t M = Mag. More yet, M is a coherent
agent model iff ag is a coherent agent program.
From this result and the encodings of mental attitudes in
both the logic and in agent programs, it is not difficult to see
that the mental notions coincide.
Corollary 17. Let ag = 〈K,B,D, I〉 be a coherent agent
program and ϕ ∈ L0 be a propositional formula, then
Mag  K(ϕ) iff ag  Kϕ
Mag  B(ϕ) iff ag  Bϕ
Mag  G(ϕ) iff ag  Gϕ
Mag  Int(ϕ) iff ag  Iϕ
Mag  Iα iff α ∈ I
We have two considerations to make about the codification
presented here. First, regarding the complexity of reasoning
about agent programs’ attitudes, to compute an agents beliefs
(or goals), it requires a linear number of propositional satis-
fiability checks on the depth of the base. Second, regarding
the notion of mental attitudes encoded here, notice that we
adopted a notion of goal as a maximal set of consistent
desires - consistent with other works in BDI programming.
It is not difficult, however, to treat other notions, as that of
Van Riemsdij et al [7], in our framework.
IV. TRACTABLE FRAGMENTS OF DPL
We have seen so far that we can use the logic L≤P ,≤D (A) to
reason about agent programs. The computational complexity
of reasoning about agents, however, is far too great to be useful
for real-world problems. In this section, we investigate some
restrictions on the kinds of agent programs and agent models
that guarantee that the reasoning problems in the resulting
logic are tractable.
Since agent programs are defined over propositional formu-
las - and reasoning about propositional satisfiability is a well-
known NP-complete problem - we define a restriction of agent
programs for which reasoning will be proved to be tractable.
Definition 18. Let Γ ⊂ L0 × N be a stratified base, we say
Γ is conjunctive iff for all 〈ϕ, i〉 ∈ Γ, ϕ is a conjunction of
literals, i.e. ϕ =
∧
lk, with lk = pk or lk = ¬pk.
A conjunctive agent program is, thus, an agent program in
which all of its bases are conjunctive.
Definition 19. Let ag = 〈K,B,D, I〉 be an agent program,
we say ag is a conjunctive agent program iff K is a set of
conjunctive formulas, B andD are conjunctive stratified bases
and for any plan α ∈ I , pre(α) and pos(α) are conjunctive
formulas.
First, we must show that we can compute the maximal
consistent subsets, such as BMax and DMax, in polynomial
time. To do so, we provide the Algorithm Max(Γ), depicted
in Figure 1.
Algorithm Max(Γ)
Input : a conjunctive stratified base Γ
Output : a set of literals ΓMax corresponding to the
maximal consistent subset of the base Γ
[1] ΓMax := {}
[2] n := maximal depth of Γ
[3] for i := 1 t o n
[4] Γi := {l | 〈ϕ, i〉 ∈ Γ and l appears in ϕ}
[5] if ¬l ∈ Γi and l ∈ Γi for some l then
[6] continue
[7] else
[8] if l ∈ Γiand¬l ∈ Γ
Max for some l then
[9] continue
[10] else
[11] ΓMax := ΓMax ∪ Γi
[12] return ΓMax
Fig. 1: Algorithm for the maximal consistent subset of Γ.
Proposition 20. Let Γ ⊂ L0 × N be a conjunctive stratified
base, then the algorithmMax presented in Figure 1 is correct,
i.e. computes ΓMax in O(n3m2) time, where n is the size of
Γ and m is the size of the biggest formula in Γ.
As a consequence, we can always decide whether a con-
junctive agent program knows (beliefs, desires or intends) a
certain formula ϕ in polynomial time.
Corollary 21. Let ag = 〈K,B,D, I〉 be a conjunctive agent
program and ϕ ∈ L0 a propositional formula in disjunctive
normal form. We can compute whether ag  K(ϕ) (ag 
B(ϕ) or ag  D(ϕ)) in polynomial time in the size of K (B
or D) and ϕ.
Corollary 21 guarantees that we can reason about the agent’s
mental state at any point in time in the program execution
in polynomial time. The execution of an agent program,
however, is usually determined by its reasoning cycle, i.e. the
execution of certain mental changing operations that describe
the agent’s reasoning. These mental operations are usually
described by means of changes in the agent’s mental state.
As such, to provide a truly tractable semantic framework to
reason about agent programming, we must ensure that these
mental changing operations can be computed in polynomial
time.
We now dedicate our attention to this problem. We aim to
provide tractable operations on agent programs to compute the
dynamic operations discussed in Section II.
First, based on the work of Girard [8] and of Liu [6], let’s
show how we can compute knowledge acquisition - interpreted
here as a public announcement - using agent programs.
Proposition 22. Let ag = 〈K,B,D, I〉 be an agent program,
ϕ ∈ L0, and ag′ = 〈K ∪ {ϕ}, B′, D′, I ′〉, where
B′ = (B ∪ {〈ϕ, 0〉})
D′ = (D ∪ {〈ϕ, 0〉})
I ′ = {α ∈ I | (B′)Max  pre(α) and (B′)Max 6 pos(α)
and ∃ϕ ∈ D′ : pos(α)  ϕ}
be the agent program resulting of agent ag obtaining a
knowledge ϕ. Then Mag′ = Mag!ϕ. We denote ag
′ by ag!ϕ.
As a result of this encoding, we can compute knowledge
acquisition/public announcement in polynomial time.
Corollary 23. Let ag = 〈K,B,D, I〉 be a conjunctive agent
program and ϕ, ψ ∈ L0 conjunctive propositional formulas.
We can compute whether ag!ϕ  K(ψ) (ag!ϕ  B(ψ) or
ag!ϕ  D(ψ)) in polynomial time in the size of K (B or
D), ϕ and ψ.
As Radical Upgrade can also be computed by means of
transformation on the agent programs, we can represent the
mental operation of belief revision in our framework.
Proposition 24. Let ag = 〈K,B,D, I〉 be a coherent agent
program and ϕ ∈ L0, let yet ag
′ = 〈K,B′, D, I ′〉, where
B′ = {〈ψ, 0〉 | ψ ∈ K} ∪ {〈ψ, i+ 2〉 | 〈ψ, i〉 ∈ B}
∪{〈ϕ, 1〉}
I ′ = {α ∈ I | (B′)Max  pre(α) and (B′)Max 6 pos(α)}
be the agent program resulting of agent ag revising her beliefs
by information ϕ. Then Mag′ = Mag⇑Pϕ. We denote ag
′ by
ag⇑Pϕ.
As a corollary, reasoning about the resulting mental state of
the agent after belief revision is a tractable problem.
Corollary 25. Let ag = 〈K,B,D, I〉 be a conjunctive agent
program and ϕ, ψ ∈ L0 conjunctive propositional formulas.
We can compute whether ag⇑Pϕ  K(ψ) (ag⇑Pϕ  B(ψ) or
ag⇑Pϕ  D(ψ)) in polynomial time in the size of K (B or
D), ϕ and ψ.
A similar result can be stated for the radical upgrade of the
agents desires, instead of beliefs. This operation represents the
adoption of a given goal.
To implement lexicographic contraction, we use the al-
gorithm depicted in Figure 2. We represent by ϕ[ψ|l] the
substitution of literal l appearing in ϕ by the formula ψ.
Proposition 26. Let ag = 〈K,B,D, I〉 be a coherent agent
program and ϕ ∈ L0, let yet ag′ = 〈K,B′, D, I ′〉, where
B′ = Cont(B,ϕ)
I ′ = {α ∈ I | (B′)Max  pre(α) and (B′)Max 6 pos(α)}
be the agent program resulting of agent ag contracting her
beliefs by information ϕ. Then Mag′ = Mag⇓Pϕ, i.e. the
Algorithm Cont(Γ, ϕ)
Input : a conjunctive stratified base Γ
a negated conjunctive formula ¬ϕ
Output : Γ⇓ϕ the lexicographic contraction of Γ by ϕ
[1] Γ⇓ϕ := {}
[1] for each 〈ψ, i〉 ∈ Γ
[2] ψ′ := ψ
[2] for each propositional symbol p in ϕ
[2] ψ′ := ψ[⊤|p][⊤|¬p]
[3] Γ⇓ϕ := Γ⇓ϕ ∪ {〈ψ
′, i〉}
[12] return Γ⇓ϕ
Fig. 2: Algorithm for the contraction of a base Γ by a formula ϕ.
algorithm Cont(Γ, ϕ) depicted in Figure 2 is correct. We
denote ag′ by ag⇓Pϕ.
As before, we can reason about the changes in the mental
state of the agent after the contraction of a belief ,or similarly
the withdraw of a goal, in polynomial time to the size of the
agent program and the formulas.
Corollary 27. Let ag = 〈K,B,D, I〉 be a conjunctive agent
program and ϕ ∈ L0 a disjunctive propositional formula and
ψ ∈ L0 conjunctive propositional formula, we can compute
whether ag⇓Pϕ  K(ψ) (ag⇓Pϕ  B(ψ) or ag⇓Pϕ  D(ψ))
in polynomial time in the size of K (B or D), ϕ and ψ.
With these results, we’ve provided a restriction of the logic
which with which reasoning about agents’ mental states is
tractable and provided a way to translate from agent models
to agent programs.
V. RELATED WORK
From the Agent Programming perspective, the two most
important works on modelling BDI mental attitudes are, in
our opinion, the seminal work of Cohen and Levesque [9] and
the work of Rao and Georgeff [10] describing the logic BDI-
CTL. While their contribution to the area is undeniable, much
criticism has been drawn to both approaches. Particularly, they
are difficult to connect with agent programming languages, by
the use of a possible-world model semantics.
Works as that of Wobcke [11] and of Hindriks and Van der
Hoek [12] propose ways to connect the semantics of a given
programming language to some appropriate logic to reason
about agent’s mental attitudes. These logics, however, cannot
represent the mental actions that characterize the practical rea-
soning process of the agent, i.e. the agent program execution.
As such, it is not clear how to establish connection between
the logic and agent programs.
Perhaps the work most related to ours in spirit is that of
Hindriks and Meyer [13]. They propose a dynamic logic for
agents and show that this logic has an equivalent semantics
based on the operational semantics of the programming lan-
guage. The main difference between from our approach is that
they choose to work in the framework of Situation Calculus
and, as such, mental actions are only implicitly defined in their
framework, while the inclusion of such actions in the language
is exactly the main advantage advocated by us. In some sense,
our work can be seen as a generalisation of their work, since
by employing Dynamic Preference Logic the equivalence they
seek between operational semantics and declarative semantics
can be automatically achieved by the results of Liu [6].
VI. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Our work has investigated the use of a Dynamic Preference
Logic to encode BDI mental attitudes and its connections to
Agent Programming. We provided an expressive fragment of
the logic for which reasoning about agents’ mental states is
tractable and how this can be computed by means of agent
programs. With this, we believe we provided a roadmap to
use Dynamic Preference Logic as a semantic framework to
specify and also implement the formal semantics of BDI agent
programming languages with declarative mental attitudes.
While we provide a fairly simple encoding of the mental
attitudes in this work, the logic discussed here is expressive
enough to encode different notions of desires, goals and
intentions. For example, we can represent the semantics of
goals as proposed by Van Riemsdijk et al [7] in our framework.
As a future work, we aim to implement a simple fragment
of an agent programming language implementing declarative
mental attitudes in this language by means of the codifications
proposed in this work. We believe such an implementation can
be used to understand the notions of mental attitudes imbued
in the language.
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